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In Grundlagen, Frege claims that (cardinal) numbers are objects existing on their own. But his 
realistic view about numbers faces an epistemological problem. For Frege, while numbers are 
objective entities, they can’t be given to us in standard ways (perception, intuition or 
representation). Numbers are abstract objects. It is natural then to ask: why would Frege adopt such 
a problematic ontology of numbers? And, how can we say for certain that there are indeed such 
abstract objects? 
This paper tackles these two questions. For the former, I give a characterization of his conception 
of numbers in terms of his logicist project and the insights underlying it, and show that for Frege 
numbers must be ‘logical objects’. To establish existence of numbers as logical objects, Frege in 
Grundlagen attempts to define them contextually by using so-called Hume’s Principle. I examine 
his argument, thereby attempting to provide an answer to the second question. Though a conclusive 
justification for his attempt can’t be given in this paper, a concept in Frege’s philosophy is proposed 
in order to better understand his argument. If developed, I am of the opinion that it might be 
possible for his ontology of numbers to be come less unproblematic and more substantial.  
Frege’s discussion on numbers contains compelling insights and arguments. It is my hope that 
some of these are revealed through this exposition. 
